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SECRET**LIMIT DISTRIBUTION**Copy No. 8
13 December 1963**MEMORANDUM****SUBJECT: Analysis of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination****A. The USSR**

1. Since the assassination of President Kennedy, Soviet leaders have refrained from taking any actions which the US and the rest of the world could interpret as calculated to embarrass the US. Soviet interest in maintaining the atmosphere of detente created by the nuclear test ban treaty was demonstrated by the appointment of Mikoyan to represent the USSR at President Kennedy's funeral. He is close to Khrushchev and personally acquainted with many high-level US officials and participated in the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis last fall. Moscow has consistently presented that settlement as the epitome of peaceful coexistence in action.

2. Soviet leaders were apparently as profoundly moved and shocked by the slaying of President Kennedy as were the leaders of America's closest allies. In addition to his formal message of condolence, Khrushchev personally visited the US Embassy. He recalled to the Ambassador that Lenin had condemned "nihilist" activities and asserted that the Soviet Communist Party is traditionally opposed to terrorism. Madame Khrushcheva also visited the embassy and referred warmly to her memories of the Vienna meeting with the Kennedys. She said her family, and indeed, all Soviet citizens she knows, were "shaken" by the tragedy. [The Danish foreign minister, who was in Moscow at the time of the assassination, reported that Gromyko seemed visibly moved by the news.] The US Embassy was impressed by the apparently genuine and deep reaction of concern, grief, and sympathy among the Soviet people over the President's death. Several

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ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTREFERENCE

Memorandum from Chief, Division of Foreign Operations dated May 14, 1962.

DETAILS

On May 14, 1962 approximately 10,000 devout Moslems, including many high-ranking Indonesian officials, were gathered on the grounds of the Merdeka Palace in Djakarta for prayers in honor of Idul Adha a Moslem holy day. President Sukarno was present, as was Defense Minister Nasution, Speaker of the House of Representatives M. Zainul Arifin and Vice Chairman of the People's Congress K. H. Idham Chalid. Chalid was leading the prayers and Nasution was acting as preacher. The congregation was assembled on the lawn, and about five minutes of the ceremony had already passed. Sukarno says he had just bowed his head when a man rose and began to fire a pistol from about fifteen feet away. Chalid was, according to Sukarno, creased by a bullet across the top of the spine; Arifin was shot through the upper chest; a policeman who threw himself at the assassin and deflected his aim was shot through the shoulder; and two other persons, one a policeman and one a member of the Palace staff, were lightly injured. All of the wounded are expected to recover.

An official announcement was immediately broadcast to the effect that Sukarno was safe and that the assassin, a member of the Dar-ul-Islam rebel group, had been apprehended. Singapore Radio picked up an erroneous UPI report based on a mistranslation of the announcement, and originally stated that Sukarno had been killed. Shortly thereafter this was corrected by an Indonesian spokesman. An Embassy officer was able to talk to an RRI official on the telephone at about 11:00 a.m. May 14, secure the official announcement, and report to the Department. (See Djakarta's telegram #2004). The official announcement stated that Dar-ul-Islam chief Kartosuwirjo had instructed nine men to assassinate the President, but did not say what had happened to the other eight men. After the assassin was apprehended the ceremony continued and Sukarno remained, but a scheduled speech to the crowd by the President was cancelled. Sukarno later told Ambassador Howard F. Jones that this had been a very close call, and that the policeman who threw himself on the assassin and deflected his aim had saved his life. Following completion of the ceremonies security authorities (male and female) searched all those who attended the ceremony before permitting them to depart.

Shortly after the assassination attempt, police and army units threw cordons in and about the city of Djakarta and began to search almost all vehicles and their passengers trying to leave the city. Streets leading to the Palace were blocked off and vehicles on the road to and from Kebajoran (a residential suburb) were stopped. The reporting officer, who was returning to Djakarta from Bogor about 11:30 a.m. that day, witnessed one such screening, and also saw several trucks full of troops speeding out of Djakarta bound

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ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

(presumably) for the area of Bandung. The region South of Bandung is now considered the center of the Dar-ul-Islam remnants who have so far escaped Army and Police efforts to wipe them out. CAS reports that, in addition to the assassin, the Authorities have also apprehended three other men who were at the ceremony. One, CAS indicates, was armed with a pistol; the other two carried hand grenades. An official of the AID Public Safety Division told the reporting officer that the police in the Garut area (Garut is south and east of Bandung) had known before May 14 that an assassination attempt might be made on the President but, through faulty communications, failed to report to the Authorities in Djakarta. However, CAS says this is not the case. CAS says a member of the Dar-ul-Islam group was picked up near Garut a day or two before Idul Adha, and details of the plot came to light. This news, CAS reports, was received in Djakarta. According to CAS, protective Authorities tried to persuade Sukarno not to make an appearance at the Merdeka Palace ceremony, but Sukarno refused to listen. For this reason there was a great augmentation of security forces protecting the President, and they were ready to move very quickly should an overt assassination attempt take place. CAS indicates that had the Authorities not known of the plot they would not have been able to move so fast and Sukarno probably would have been killed. They say the assassin managed to get off only one aimed shot before he was hit and deflected by a policeman; the shots which wounded five other Indonesians were strays fired while the assassin was struggling.

An eye-witness account by a correspondent of Antara News Agency stated the assassin appeared to be a man of about thirty-five years, wearing a white shirt, light-brown coat and sarong. He says Sukarno was in front of the assassin, and was flanked by Defense Minister Nasution on his left and his private secretary on his right. As soon as shots sounded security officers surrounded Sukarno and took him to an office about forty meters from the spot; at the same time a man in the fifth row behind Sukarno struck the assassin seconds before security officers grabbed him and carried him off. The same account goes on to say that Chalid and Nasution resumed leading the prayer shortly afterward, and that it continued for fifteen minutes. At the end the public was told to go home by a north gate, where they were checked by security forces.

The Djakarta representative of UPI (an American) attended the ceremonies and was an eye-witness to the attempt. His account of the incident was held up by the telegraph office until 11:00 p.m. He reported that the assassin began shouting "Allah be praised" and shot once in the air before shooting at the President. He has told an Embassy officer that the assassin is reported to have been carrying an official invitation card to attend the ceremony.

It was reported to the Embassy that the screening of vehicles ended the evening of May 14, but presumably further investigations are still going on about which the Mission is not being told. Official announcements say this is the fifth assassination attempt which has been made against Sukarno since he has been President of Indonesia. The first was a hand grenade attempt in 1957 at a school in Djakarta. Another was a strafing of the Presidential Palace by an Indonesian Air Force Plane in March, 1960. Two other attempts have

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ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

taken place in Makassar. The President has referred to his narrow escape publicly on several recent occasions, emphasizing that only Allah's protection (and one should conclude Allah's blessing) has saved his life. The incident will likely add lustre to the mystique about Sukarno - that he lives under Allah's special protection - and play a part in building up Sukarno's image before the public.

Aside from this report and others cited above, no other information concerning this matter has been acquired by the Embassy. It is emphasized that the press in Indonesia is strictly controlled, so the authenticity of official accounts cannot, in all cases, be vouched for.

STATUS: Closed

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AIRGRAM

(Departmental and Foreign Service)

7/11/6-1462

ORIGIN/ACTION		
RM/R	HEP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	ICA
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

NO. A-53 **CONFIDENTIAL** Commission No. 284

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : Medan A-282, Surabaya A-273

FROM : Amembassy DJAKARTA

SUBJECT : Sukarno Assassination Attempt

REF :

1962 JUN 17 AM 11 40

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DATE:

June 14, 1962 *pic*

Acting director of MacLaine Watson, Ltd. (which does considerable amount of business with GOI), who is knowledgeable source, told reporting officer June 5 that Indonesian closely connected with Palace claims band who plotted assassination of Sukarno numbers 36, each of whom sworn to kill the President if the assassin chosen before him fails. According to same Indonesian, would-be assassin apprehended by security forces at scene of May 14 attempt on Sukarno's life provided this info after being severely beaten by interrogators.

Source speculates that Sukarno's knowledge that 36 more assassins are presumably awaiting to try succeed where present detainee failed is reason for added security measures in vicinity of palace. (Road in front of building blocked to traffic nightly with barbed wire barriers.)

JONES



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 15 1962

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